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Newspaper Guild v. NLRB: The Duty to
Bargain and the Press

In Newspaper Guild v. NLRB,' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that collective bargaining was not mandatory on
all aspects of a newspaper's Ethics Code and Office Rules.' The court also
held that the penalty provisions attached to these rules could not be separated from the substantive provisions that they were designed to enforce: both were either mandatorily bargainable or they were not.8 This
decision is the most recent one reported that considers the applicability
of the National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) to a newspaper in light of
the newspaper's assertion of its first amendment rights.
The Pottstown Mercury, a newspaper in suburban Philadelphia owned
by Peerless Publications, Inc. (both the newspaper and the publisher will
be referred to as the Mercury), operated under a collective bargaining
agreement with the Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia, Local 10,
AFL-CIO (Guild).5 On July 1, 1968, the Mercury posted on its bulletin
boards a list of twenty-five General Office Rules, e prepared by the publisher. The general scope of the rules was employee conduct,7 and each
employee was bound to adhere to the rules under penalty of discharge. At
no time prior to the posting was there any collective bargaining with the
Guild over the formulation, effectuation, or impact of the rules.
In addition to the General Office Rules, on April 15, 1974, the Mercury
posted in its offices and published in its pages a Code of Ethics. The
Code contained a preliminary statement of general principles and four
substantive sections designated Ethics, Accuracy and Objectivity, Fair
1. 105 L.R.R.M. 2001 (Aug. 13, 1980).
2. Id. at 2008.
3. Id. at 2010.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-158 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
5. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2002. All facts are from the court's opinion.
6. The General Office Rules are given in their entirety in an appendix to the court's
opinion, Id. at 2015-16.
7. Among other things, the rules dealt with abuse of liquor, disorderly conduct, use of
company equipment for private purposes, garnishment of wages for personal debts, posting
of circulars, treatment of company property, solicitation of funds on company premises, and
various reporting and record keeping procedures.
. The Code of Ethics is given in its entirety in an appendix to the court's opinion, 105

LR.R.M. at 2014-15.
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Play, and Pledge. The Code was loosely based on an ethics code adopted
by the national society of professional journalists. Its stated purposes
were to spell out the Mercury's standards of integrity, objectivity, and
fairness, and to protect and enhance its quality and credibility.
The Ethics section of the Code was the primary issue. This section was
said to be based upon the principle that "newspaper people must be free
of obligation to any interest other than the public's right to know the
truth". 9 The Ethics section prohibited "first, acceptance of anything of
value which could 'compromise the integrity of newspaper people and
their employers,' including gifts, favors, free travel, special treatment or
privileges; and second, conflicts of interest, real or apparent, including
secondary employment, political involvement, holding of public office,
and service in community organizations."10 Employees were bound to adhere to the Code under penalty of discipline.
On June 4, 1974, the Guild notified the Mercury that the Code of
Ethics was an unfair labor practice in that it involved unilateral changes
in the terms and conditions of employment. The Guild then requested
that management engage in collective bargaining concerning the matter."
The Mercury refused on the ground that the imposition of the Code and
Office Rules was a management prerogative. The Guild thereupon filed
charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled on September 23, 1975, that
the Code of Ethics and the General Office Rules were mandatory bargaining subjects, and that the Mercury's failure to comply with its duty to
bargain was an unfair labor practice.13 The NLRB affirmed part and rejected part of the ALJ's conclusions. It held that "the Mercury's Code of
Ethics did not affect the terms and conditions of employment so as to
constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining; however, it agreed with the
ALJ that the penalty provisions were mandatory bargaining subjects."8 In
addition, the ALU's holding that the Office Rules were mandatory bargaining subjects, both substantively and with regard to penalties, was affirmed by the NLRB. 1' The Mercury appealed on the ground that under
the first amendment it had an absolute right to impose the conditions
and penalties embodied in the two sets of rules, and that it therefore
could not be compelled to bargain concerning such matters, irrespective
9.

Id. at 2004.

10. Id.
11. This was subsequently expanded to include the Office Rules.
12. Peerless Publications, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 244, 95 L.R.R.M. 1612 (1977), enforcement
denied sub nom. Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 105 L.R.R.M. 2001 (Aug. 13, 1980).

13. Id. at 245, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1613.
14. Id.
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of the language of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA.
Three earlier cases are essential to an understanding of the court's decision in Newspaper Guild-Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB, 1 6 The Capital Times Co., 17 and Associated Press v. NLRB."'
These cases furnish the necessary background for understanding the relationship between the NLRA, the press, and the types of management decisions exempt from the duty to bargain.
In Fibreboard,the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope
of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning
of section 8(d) of the NLRA. The Court held that, on the facts of this
case," the replacement of employees in an existing bargaining unit with
those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar
conditions of employment was a statutory subject of collective bargaining
under section 8(d).20
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurrence to the Court's opinion, was concerned over what he perceived to be the broad implications of the opinion. He stated that there were passages in the Court's opinion which, if
given an expansive interpretation, seemed to imply "that any issue which
may reasonably divide an employer and his employees must be the subject of compulsory collective bargaining. ' 2
Mr. Justice Stewart expressed particular concern that one portion of
the Court's opinion, if interpreted broadly, might lead to the conclusion
that every decision which could affect job security would be a subject of
compulsory collective bargaining.2" He said that there were decisions by
management that would clearly imperil job security without properly
15. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), provides that "[i]t
shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of

his employees. . ." and § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. III 1979), defines collective bargaining as meeting and conferring in good faith "with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment...
16. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
17. 223 N.L.R.B. 651, 91 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1976).
18. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
19. Fibreboard had become greatly concerned with the high cost of its maintenance operation and had undertaken a study of the possibility of effecting cost savings by engaging
an independent contractor to do the maintenance work. Fibreboard found an independent
contractor to do the same maintenance work as its union employees at a price that would
save Fibreboard $225,000 annually. On July 31, 1959, the maintenance employees represented by the union were discharged and the independent contractor took over. The union
filed unfair labor practice charges against the employer. 379 U.S. at 206-07, 219.
20. Id. at 215.
21. Id. at 221.
22. The Court had said that the words of section 8(d) plainly cover termination of
employment. Id. at 210.
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Mr. Justice Stewart emphasized

Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty
to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not
in themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment.2 4
He said that the purpose of section 8(d) was to describe a limited area
subject to the duty of collective bargaining and that those management
decisions which were "fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate
enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security
5
should be excluded from that area.'
In Capital Times, the NLRB was confronted with a factual situation
remarkably similar to that of Newspaper Guild. In this case the publisher
instituted a code of ethics that prohibited the acceptance of gifts from
outside sources which were used in the performance of employees' duties.
The employees were bound to adhere to the code under penalty of
discharge.
The NLRB held that gifts received by news personnel in their professional capacities from news sources did not constitute wages within the
meaning of section 8(d), and that the code of ethics did not affect the
"terms and conditions of employment such as to make it a mandatory
subject of bargaining.' 2 But the NLRB also held that since the suspension and discharge provision of the code of ethics directly affected employment security, the publisher was obligated to bargain about this
7
section.'
The NLRB relied in large part upon Fibreboardfor its decision. The
NLRB considered the Court in Fibreboardto have set out three characteristics that determined whether a subject was appropriate for collectivebargaining resolution. These three characteristics were: (1) whether the
subject involved an economic decision by the employer; (2) whether the
subject was commonly bargained about in the industry in question; and
23. Mr. Justice Stewart gave as examples an enterprise's decision to invest in labor-saving machinery or to liquidate assets and go out of business. Id. at 223.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 223 N.L.R.B. at 651, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1481.
27. Chairman Fanning dissented from the NLRB's treatment of the penalties as separate from the substantive provisions that they were designed to enforce. He stated that
"[t]he penalty provision is a constituent part of the rules. It has no separate existence and,
standing alone, has no meaning whatsoever." Id. at 657, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1488. (Member
Fanning, dissenting).
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(3) whether the subject affected the job security of the employee."
The NLRB considered none of these characteristics applicable to the
code of ethics; therefore, it held that the code of ethics was not a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. However, relying upon
Fibreboard,the NLRB concluded that the penalty provision affected the
employees' job security and was an appropriate subject for collective
bargaining.
The third case that is essential to an understanding of Newspaper
Guild is Associated Press. In this case, the Associated Press had discharged an employee on the grounds that his work Was not satisfactory.
The Associated Press intimated that the employee had shown bias in the
course of the performance of his duties; however, the evidence suggested
that the true reason the employee was discharged was because of his
union activity. The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the
Associated Press and the Associated Press argued that any regulation
protective of union activities was invalid as applied to the press because
of the special protection accorded the press by the first amendment.
The Supreme Court held that, on the facts of this case, the NLRA did
not abridge the freedom of press safeguarded by the first amendment and
that the Act did not permit a newspaper to discharge an employee because of his union activity or agitation for collective bargaining. 9 The
Court's holding was purposely narrow, undoubtedly because the Court
was sensitive to the fact that it was coming perilously close to impinging
upon the first amendment rights of the press.
To emphasize the narrowness of its holding the Court stated that
proper implementation of the Act would have "no relation whatever to
the impartial distribution of news." ' 0 Furthermore, the Court went on to
state that its decision "in nowise circumscribes the full freedom and liberty of the petitioner to publish the news as it desires it published or to
enforce policies of its own choosing with respect to the editing and rewriting of news for publication. .... -1
In Fibreboard,the Supreme Court had occasion to consider section 8(d)
of the NLRA and the scope of the duty to bargain collectively. In Associated Press, the Court considered the applicability of the NLRA to the
press in the narrow confines of a situation in which an employee had been
discharged solely due to his union activity. In Newspaper Guild, as in
Capital Times, the court had to consider the scope of the duty to bargain
collectively as applied to the press in a situation other than an unlawful
discharge.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 653-54, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1485-86.
301 U.S. at 130-32.
Id. at 133.
Id.
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The court's opinion in Newspaper Guild consisted of three main parts;
in each part the court considered the respective positions of the Mercury,
the Guild, and the NLRB. In the first part of the opinion, the court considered the Mercury's contention that under the first amendment it had
an absolute right to impose the conditions and penalties embodied in the
two sets of rules, and that it therefore could not be compelled to bargain
concerning such matters. The court disposed of the Mercury's contention
in the first two sentences of part IV of the opinion. It stated that "[tihe
Mercury's reliance on the First Amendment is plainly foreclosed by longstanding precedent. It is firmly established that a newspaper is not immune from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act merely because it is an agency of the press." 2
The court went on to cite several cases in which statutes of general
applicability (such as the National Labor Relations Act) had been enforced against the press."3 In this part of the opinion, the court concluded
that its ruling would preserve to the Mercury exclusive control over the
aspects of its operation, without the burden of mandatory bargaining,
which were fundamental to its enterprise (such as editorial content and
other matters at the heart of a newspaper's independence) and thus avoid
any constitutional problem."
In the second part of the opinion, the court confronted the Guild's contention that every matter touching in any way upon conditions of employment was mandatorily bargainable under the NLRA. As was the case
with the Mercury's position, the court disposed of the Guild's contention
very quickly. In so doing, the court relied principally upon Mr. Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboardand the NLRB's holding in Capital
Times.
The court considered that a publisher's decision to institute a code of
ethics was largely analogous to those decisions alluded to by Justice
Stewart 5 which "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. . . [and] are
fundamental to the basic direction of. a corporate enterprise. . . or concern its basic scope. . . ."" Other cases were cited by the court as having
elaborated upon the Fibreboard concurrence, but the court considered
none of them to have added anything of substance to opinion.37
32. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2005-06, citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 132.
33. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1947) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (antitrust laws); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (general taxation).
34. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
35. 379 U.S. at 223.
36. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2007, quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at
223, 225.
37. See Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 n.19
(1971); International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 915-16 (D.C.
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The court also expressed agreement with the NLRB's conclusion in this
case and in Capital Times that "protection of the editorial integrity of a
newspaper lies at the core of publishing control. '5' 8 The court stated that,
with respect to news publications, credibility was central to the ultimate
product and to the conduct of the enterprise.' It went on to say that
"editorial control and the ability to shield that control from outside influences are within the First Amendment's zone of protection and therefore
entitled to special consideration.'"
Finally, in the third part of the opinion, the court addressed the
NLRB's position in the case, and in so doing, announced its guidelines for
determining whether the provisions of a newspaper's code of ethics were
appropriate subjects of mandatory collective bargaining. The NLRB considered that the Office Rules were subjects for mandatory bargaining in
all their aspects;'" that the substantive provisions of the Code constituted
a subject properly reserved for management and were not bargainable;
and that enforcement of any of the provisions through punitive action
was subject to mandatory bargaining.
The court concluded that the NLRB had been cognizant of the
problems presented by the tension between the employees' right to bargain collectively and the right of the owner of a newspaper to safeguard
the credibility of his publication; however, the court considered the
NLRB's approach to be faulty in two respects. First, the NLRB improperly lumped together the entire Code of Ethics in a single category, holding all of it, without individualized analysis, exempt from mandatory bargaining. Second, the NLRB erroneously separated the penalty provisions
of the Code from the substantive provisions that they were designed to
enforce.
The court stated that each of the provisions of the Code should be
scrutinized to distinguish those provisions that were central to the Mercury's interest in the preservation of its legitmate management prerogatives and affected the employees only minimally, from those that, although not essential to the publication's freedom to conduct its business,
had a significant impact on the employees."2 The court thus advocated a
type of balancing process that would take into account the relative imporCir. 1972); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1965).
38. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2007.
39. Id. at 2007 n. 33.
40. Id. at 2007-08.
41. Rule 11, which dealt with confidentiality of news and advertising matter, etc., was
not considered to be truly a part of the Office Rules. It was more properly considered as a
part of the Code of Ethics. Id. at 2015-16 (Appendix).
42. Id. at 2008.
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tance of the proposed actions to the two parties."' As an example of what
it meant, the court said that it perceived significant differences between
"a gift from a news source designed to influence news coverage, and a
freebie (e.g., a ticket to a major league baseball game) given relatively
indiscriminately to journalists and other well-known persons." 4 ' In this
instance, regulation of the former category would be reasonably related to
the core concerns of the newspaper's management without vitally affecting the interests of the employees; regulation of the latter would likely
not be reasonably related to core concerns and would interfere substantially with the private lives of the employees.
With respect to the NLRB's treatment of the penalty provisions as separate from the substantive provisions of the Code, the court said simply
that it could not understand how penalties could be separated for NLRA
purposes from the substantive provisions that they were designed to enforce." The court concluded that if the substantive provision was an appropriate subject for mandatory collective bargaining, then the corresponding penalty provision was likewise mandatorily bargainable. If the
substantive provision was not an appropriate subject for mandatory collective bargaining, then likewise the corresponding penalty provision was
not mandatorily bargainable.46
The court's result in Newspaper Guild appears to be correct, notwithstanding the fact that the court erred in its treatment of the Mercury's
argument and in its corresponding first amendment analysis. The court
mistakenly understood the Mercury's argument to be that the NLRA was
inapplicable to the press due to the first amendment. In actuality, the
Mercury's argument was that the conditions and penalties embodied in
its Code and Office Rules represented a type of management decision
which was protected by the first amendment and that this type of management decision was outside the scope of the NLRA. Also, the court
erred in stating that the Mercury's reliance on the first amendment was
precluded by long-standing precedent. The court's reasoning is unclear,
43. See Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964); International Ladies
Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 915-16 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also 105
L.R.R.M. at 2009 nn. 43, 44 & 45.
44. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2009 (footnotes omitted). Other examples given by the court were:
(1) differences between a reporter's secondary employment constituting a clear conflict of
interest (i.e., working for a major advertiser) and such activities as holding public office and
service in community organizations; and (2) differences for bargaining purposes between
categories of employees (i.e., reporters and editorial personnel vs. maintenance and circulation employees). Id.
45. The court expressed agreement with a similar conclusion of Chairman Fanning in
The Capital Times Co., 223 N.L.R.B. at 656-57, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1487-88.
46. The court remanded the case to the NLRB. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2010.
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particularly in light of its subsequent statement that "editorial control
and the ability to shield that control from outside influences are within
zone of protection and therefore entitled to spethe First Amendment's
47
consideration."
cial
Despite the court's trouble in comprehending the Mercury's argument
and in correctly articulating the proper first amendment analysis, the decision is admirable in one important respect. The balancing process advocated by the court is both logical and desirable in that it takes into account the relative importance of the provisions to the two parties." The
publisher's property rights in his newspaper plus the first amendment
rights accorded to the press are weighed against the employees' right to
organize.
As a practical matter the first amendment protection of the press, when
coupled with the publisher's property rights in his newspaper, will nearly
always tip the scales in the publisher's favor. However, this is perhaps as
it should be. Justice Sutherland, in his dissenting opinion in Associated
Press, graphically described the special position occupied by the press:
The destruction or abridgment of a free press-which constitutes one
of the most dependable avenues through which information of public and
governmental activities may be transmitted to the people-would be an
event so evil in its consequences that the least approach toward that end
should be halted at the threshold."9
EMMITTE HAMILTON GRIGGS

47. Id. at 2007-08.
48. The Supreme Court detailed a similar balancing process in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 261 (1966).
49. 301 U.S. at 136 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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